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Introduction
Cooperation between law enforcement agencies on both national and international levels is critical
because research has shown that most terrorist groups end either due to them joining the political
process or the success of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in arresting or killing key
leaders.[1] While law enforcement agency efforts clearly failed on 9/11, the effectiveness of general law
enforcement cooperation since then is debatable. Specifically, when this cooperation is analyzed in
relation to efforts to combat the linkage between criminal activity and terror around the world, there
appears to be several shortcomings.[2]  This paper will show that the link between crime and terror is
real and presents a number of challenges around the world.  Despite some efforts to improve law
enforcement cooperation on various levels, overall efforts to combat the criminal-terror nexus have only
been moderately successful.    
Link Between Crime and Terror
There is a substantial link between crime and terror. While international criminals and terrorists often
have different motives for their activities, there are more forces that bring terrorists and criminals
together than keep them apart. Coincidentally, the international criminal-terrorist nexus is increasing.[3] 
Indeed, there are a number of similarities between criminal and terrorist organizations. Both are typically
rational actors, employ violence and intimidation as means of achieving their ends, and both create
victims.[4]  Criminal activities that terrorists engage in include kidnapping, cigarette smuggling, robbery,
extortion, arms trading and drug smuggling.[5]
Most researchers and experts agree that the current international link between crime and terror began in
the 1980s as the FARC exhibited great success in financing its terrorist organizations through the drug
trade.[6]  Gradually, other terror groups around the globe caught on and began to increase their links
with criminal elements in order to diversify or expand their financial support. Since 9/11, another reason
for the growing link between terror and organized criminal activity is that with the global war on terror
restricting financial support to terrorist groups, these groups have had to engage more heavily in
criminal activity.[7]  An additional factor that encourages terrorist and criminal groups to work together is
that they both typically operate in areas with limited government controls, weak law enforcement and
open borders.[8] Both groups also use similar communications and technologies as well as similar
money laundering mechanisms and methods for moving funds.[9]
The primary reason that criminal networks support terrorist networks is that terrorist networks undermine
state security, making it easier for criminal networks to operate. In turn, terrorist networks back criminal
organizations because criminal organizations generate revenue streams that terrorist networks can draw
financing from.[10] This creates a symbiotic relationship between the two organizations where both
benefit mutually from each other.  A complimentary theory of how terrorism and crime are linked is
viewed as an evolution from grass roots support for terrorism that grows to such an extent that more
robust funding is needed than what can be provided by state sponsorship.[11]  According to this theory,
terrorists turn to criminal activities when their size and goals exceed the financial capacity of their
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=57[10/5/2011 11:47:32 AM]
original base of support.
Terrorism’s link to criminal activity makes it more difficult to target terrorists because of the hybrid terror-
criminal organizations that are formed increase the complexity of the organization.[12]  This confounds
law enforcement agency efforts to target and capture terrorists. Indeed, terrorists and organized
criminals often comprise complex network structures that intersect, making it easy for terrorists to hide
among transnational criminal groups.[13]  Another factor that makes the criminal-terrorist nexus so
difficult to defeat is that the two parties learn from each other.[14] This implies that it is necessary to
understand how the two types of organizations interact and evolve in order to effectively target and
neutralize them. An additional challenge with defeating criminal-terrorist networks is that there has not
been a great deal of research conducted on them, and the research that does exist appears to focus on
proving that the phenomenon occurs in the first place.[15]
The Challenges
While 9/11 terrorists were able to plan, train, retrieve finances, sustain and execute their operation all
on American soil, it was their link to the international criminal-terrorist network that ultimately made their
mission possible.[16]  Specifically, it was their tie to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan which
funded their mission. Indeed, one area where the link between crime and terror is perhaps most prolific
is Central Asia, which is comprised of a number of weak states and is at a strategic hub for the
transportation of drugs from East and Southeast Asia to Europe.  
As Peters so vividly recounts in Seeds of Terror, there is a clear link between the poppy production and
illicit drug trade that emerges from Afghanistan and the financial support that Al Qaeda and the Taliban
receive from it.[17] Indeed, the Taliban raises between 15% and 40% of its budget from taxing the drug
trade.[18] The poppy problem has been a specific challenge for U.S. military forces and law
enforcement agencies operating in Afghanistan. On one hand, eradicating poppies is necessary
because the Taliban collects taxes from poppy farmers, which provides substantial revenue that
supports their operations.[19] On the other hand, eradication of poppy fields leaves farmers without a
means for feeding their families and encourages them to engage in the insurgency or terrorist
activities.[20]  One example of why it is so difficult to eradicate this source of income from Al Qaeda is
that it is so lucrative.  For example, police chiefs in poppy-growing districts will pay up to $100,000 for a
six month appointment, for a salary of just $60 per month.[21]  This implies that only those involved in
the poppy trade could possibly afford such a position and that they would then turn a blind-eye towards
the drug trade and potentially even support it.
Tajikistan is another country in Central Asia where efforts to combat the growing terror-drug link have
been largely unsuccessful. As approximately 87% of the world’s opium production originates in
Afghanistan, Tajikistan is an important thoroughfare for the flow of this drug to the West.[22]
Consequently, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a powerful terrorist-criminal organization came to
power in Tajikistan and eroded much of the government’s legitimacy both with the people and the
international community.[23] Finally, two additional locations where criminal-terrorist organizations have
created instability in Central Asia are Uzbekistan and Chechnya.[24]
Unfortunately, Central Asia is not the only place in the world where terrorist organizations and crime are
linked.  Another example is Colombia where despite more than twenty years of U.S. assistance in
combating the FARC and the drug trade, the problem still persists.  In some aspects the terror-criminal
nexus in Colombia has expanded over the past thirty years, and now the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19)
also receives its funding through international drug trafficking.[25] Another area where a criminal-
terrorist network flourishes is the Balkans. Indeed, efforts to combat the Albanian Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) have not been successful for many reasons.[26]  Part of the reason for this is that the KLA
supported the U.S. in its air war against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999. Albanian criminal-terrorists
have one of the most clandestine organizations in Europe and serve as a key smuggler for the
movement of drugs from Central Asia into Europe.[27]
The Philippines is another place where criminal-terrorist networks have escaped justice. One recent
failure was efforts to combat the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group which is linked to Al Qaeda.[28] Despite U.S.
involvement to assist the Philippines in combating this terrorist group since 2003, Abu Sayyaf and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front have continually been able to kidnap foreign tourists and assistance
workers in the Southern Philippines in exchange for ransoms which finance terrorist operations.[29] 
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Finally, other examples of criminal-terrorist organizations that have escaped law enforcement efforts to
defeat them are The Shining Path in Peru, the Karen National Union in Myanmar, and the Liberation
Tigers in Sri Lanka.[30]
Cooperation
Perhaps the biggest challenge to cooperation between law enforcement agencies is that most of the
major terror-criminal organization threats exist outside the U.S. This means that often, the U.S. military is
employed to combat these threats (Afghanistan, Philippines, Kosovo) instead of traditional U.S. law
enforcement agencies.[31]  Therefore, cooperation takes on two perspectives, that internal to domestic
law enforcement agencies and the effort that is external to the U.S..[32] While internal efforts have been
consistently improving, the majority of the major terror-criminal networks that threaten global stability
exist outside of the U.S., where it is more difficult for U.S. law enforcement agencies to have an
impact.[33] And those efforts that have been conducted to increase cooperation on a global level have
focused predominantly on military involvement or agreements for sharing information or extradition
agreements. There have been only limited improvements in the employment of U.S. law enforcement
expertise abroad or enhancement of international law enforcement agencies. In addition, one factor that
complicates matters is that it is difficult to categorize law enforcement activities as either domestic or
international as most threats now transcend borders.[34]
There are several factors that encourage various agencies to work together.  Since 9/11 it appears that
the efforts of domestic law enforcement agencies to improve cooperation have been moderately
successful. One factor that encourages agencies to cooperate is that multiple agencies are often tasked
with complimentary missions such as the CIA and FBI counterintelligence mission in the 1980s  in efforts
to arrest Aldrich Ames, a Soviet spy.  Much of the reason for this cooperation was that both agencies
working on their own only had half of the picture, and this same phenomenon helps to drive law
enforcement cooperation in some cases today.  A second major factor that causes agencies to work
together is that various agencies have different powers.[35]  For example, various law enforcement
agencies have different jurisdictions, and in order for them to be successful, they must work together. 
Similarly, various agencies are allotted different constitutional uses of power to ensure that power is not
abused.[36] 
Unfortunately, there are also several problems with the current arrangement of law enforcement
agencies inside the United States which makes it difficult for them to cooperate and prosecute the War
on Terror.  There are currently 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions within the United States.[37] 
This means that for any terrorist threat or criminal organization that is operating in a broad geographical
area, the investigation authority usually is shared by a number of different agencies.  So even when
agencies want to cooperate, it is often a time consuming task for them to figure out who they need to
cooperate with. Another complicating factor is that various agencies also have conflicting roles.  As the
9/11 Commission pointed out, the intelligence community could not connect the dots prior to 9/11 largely
because it was shrouded in secrecy and more emphasis was placed on who was allowed to view the
dots than on collaborative sharing of information in order to put the whole picture together.[38]  
The protection of informants, as identities often have to be revealed during criminal proceedings, also
stunts the willingness of agencies to cooperate in many cases.[39]  Equally important, the fact that local
and state agency officers are expected to maintain focus on local problems often makes collaboration a
secondary or tertiary priority.[40]  While keeping a local focus can be helpful in developing contacts
through good community relations, it also hurts law enforcement efforts specifically in combating
terrorism because there is no incentive system for state and local law enforcement officers to think
strategically about national and international threats.  A final problem is that distrust often exists
between law enforcement agencies at different levels, this is especially the case between state and local
agencies and federal agencies.  
Another challenge to cooperation is that a large amount of local and state law enforcement officials do
not trust the FBI.  This distrust makes it very difficult, sometimes impossible, for state, local and federal
authorities to coordinate and synchronize their actions.  Perhaps there is no better example of this than
just prior to 9/11 when federal authorities were aware that Al Qaida was planning something and were
actually looking for a couple of the 9/11 hijackers, but local officials were not aware of this.  Therefore,
when a Maryland state trooper pulled over one of the hijackers for a routine traffic stop the night prior to
the attacks, the trooper simply let him go with a ticket rather than detaining him and handing him over to
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federal investigators.[41]  In the case of 9/11, it is likely that the plot could have been thwarted or at
least delayed or mitigated had there been more cooperation and information sharing between local,
state and federal agencies.
On the international level, the U.S. has made some important progress in improving counter-terrorism
coordination. These improvements include legal assistance treaties, emplacement of FBI legal attaches
in European courts and police officer exchange programs between the U.S. and various European
countries.[42] These efforts also include agreements between the U.S. and European Union initiated by
the European Police Office (Europol) for mutual legal assistance and extradition of suspected criminals
and terrorists.[43]  The U.S. has also undertaken efforts through FBI cooperative programs with
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and other nations that focus on arresting suspected terrorists
abroad and disrupting their financial support mechanisms.[44]
There are also some examples of international efforts that do not directly involve the U.S. that have
helped to improve international law enforcement cooperation. One example is Southern Africa, where 11
countries formed a cooperative organization called the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs
Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO).  SARPCCO has coordinated operations against organized crime
and improved law enforcement cooperation between the member countries.  Lessons learned from the
SARPCCO and their multilateral expansion outside of their sphere to places as far as South America
and Iran have shown that confidence building measures, joint border operations, and sufficient funding
are critical to successful joint law enforcement activities.[45] Another area where there has been some
success is the Asia-Pacific region where Australia has taken a lead in developing multi-lateral law
enforcement agreements.  One example is the Pacific Transnational Criminal Intelligence Network which
combats both crime and terrorism in the region.  This also includes a $3.6 million project between
Australia and the Philippines to enhance the Philippines’ counter-terrorism capacity with regards to
sharing information, explosives investigation techniques, and forensics.[46]
There are many areas, however, where international law enforcement cooperation efforts have been
lacking. One example was a failure of U.S. law enforcement agencies to cooperate in the cases of
Mzoudi and Mouttassedeq in Germany and Abu Hamza in England.[47]  In addition, the U.S. has failed
to get the European Union to assume a larger role in combating international terrorism, partly due to a
lack of co-equal consultation between the two parties.[48] The effectiveness of U.S. efforts at overseas
law enforcement has also been limited by a lack of coordination with partner countries overseas and a
lack of oversight.[49] Specifically, more effort is needed to enable and encourage foreign law
enforcement agencies to enforce law and order in their own countries.  
One barrier to international law enforcement cooperation is sudden changes in the macroclimate
regarding the relations between two countries.  This has been the case on several occasions between
the U.S. and China.[50] Other problems that limit international law enforcement cooperation are diverse
legal systems and law enforcement structures, a lack of communication means between international
law enforcement organizations, and differing approaches and priorities.[51] 
Analysis
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, while there has been some success in improving law
enforcement cooperation since 9/11, there is still plenty of work to be done.  This is especially the case
in efforts to curb the growing nexus between criminal activity and terrorism. Indeed, the growing
economy created by merging the economies of terror and international crime is approximately $1.5
trillion, the size of the gross domestic products of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland
combined.[52] Complicating the problem, is the fact that terrorists don’t need a lot of money to conduct
operations.  9/11 only cost an estimated $300,000 for Al Qaeda to conduct.[53]  In addition, by claiming
that 9/11 was an act of war instead of an act of terrorism or crime against humanity, the U.S. lost an
opportunity to strengthen international legal practice that could have thwarted future terrorist attacks.[54]
As previously discussed, many law enforcement agencies in the U.S. have found it difficult to find the
link between crime and terrorism, choosing to focus on either criminal organizations or terror groups
individually rather than as a network.[55] But there are many efforts that can be made to improve in this
area.  A good place to start is improving our understanding of foreign police systems and courts, sharing
information with international allies, and providing both legal and law enforcement assistance to
allies.[56] This must be done to a much greater extent than what is currently practiced.
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Other measures that can be effective are multilateral agreements, person to person training, meetings
and assistance visits and using other economic and development venues to propel law enforcement
cooperatives. Additional areas that need improvement are measuring advances in international
cooperation, wider acceptance of existing agreements and protocols, focus on improving law
enforcement capacity in developing countries, streamlining extradition processes and enhancing the
utilization and sharing of available databases and information.[57]
There is also a need to develop a strategy to break the link between the black market economy and the
legitimate economy. A specific way ahead would be to first focus on defeating international money
laundering and then encouraging international banks to adhere to international rules and regulations
which would make dirty money more difficult to transfer.[58] Another effort that can help is to formalize
operational level planning procedures for international law enforcement missions that link the tactical law
enforcement mission on the ground with overarching national security goals.[59] In accomplishing this,
the placement of liaison officers with overseas law enforcement agencies, the sharing of law
enforcement information and intelligence, and cooperation with international mechanisms such as
Interpol and Europol are critical.[60] Other strategies that can help, especially on the domestic level, are
outreach to various communities such as Muslims and Hispanics.[61] A final area of focus might be on
improving some of the underlying conditions that lead to criminal activity and terrorism in the first place. 
Indeed, research shows that there is a connection between poverty and lack of education and
terrorism.[62]  Thus, efforts to improve education and the financial conditions of disenfranchised
populations both at home and abroad could be very helpful in defeating criminal-terror networks.  This
could greatly reduce the challenge currently faced by international law enforcement agencies.
Conclusion
While America and the international community have made some notable efforts to attack the growing
international criminal-terrorist nexus, there has been only limited success.  At best, current efforts are
merely serving to disrupt the nexus, and have failed to decisively neutralize it.  In addition, there has not
been a concerted international effort to attack the nexus specifically, as most programs focus on either
criminals or terrorists, but not in the areas where these two types of organizations are linked together. 
The advantage of focusing at the point where criminals and terrorists intersect is that these efforts will
have a synergistic affect against both criminals and terrorists, neutralizing the symbiotic relationship that
exists between the two entities.  In accomplishing this, cooperation between international and domestic
law enforcement agencies is critical.  There must be focus on the diplomatic level to build trust and
strong international relationships between countries that will set the conditions for strong law
enforcement partnerships and intelligence sharing. Mutual respect is critical in building this trust, and
outreach and exchange programs on all levels can help to achieve this.  Finally, more funding is needed
to enhance the ability of U.S. law enforcement agencies to expand overseas and build the strong
partnerships that are requisite to defeating the global criminal-terrorist nexus.
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